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Watertown, Massachusetts, United States
Editor Latino World Online.com and Mundo Latino Online.com

Saturday, April 5, 2008

Enron V: the home mortgage crisis. Part V

A point Of View: It takes two to tango or I told you so. Your choice
By Paul V. Montesino, PhD, MBA.

Most of us like to issue the famous phrase “I told you so.”

Like most humans I must confess-here the confession goes again-I am not immune and I feel tempted occasionally to fall for the trap. And I call it a trap, because it is an egotistical expression, one that solves nothing and serves no one and no purpose. When I warn you or others about what I think is going to happen and it does, I really does not fix the basic problem. All I am saying is that you did not listen to me and are paying for the consequences. That is not nice. I really do not like you to pay for your own mistakes just to make me happy.

But having explained myself I guess I have to tell you that I told you so. I have been writing these articles about the home mortgage crisis for several tiring months now and warned you that the crisis was going to outlast my writings. Indeed it has. So much has happened from that date when I first covered the issue that I am starting to think I should change professions and become an astrologer. But no, don’t tell me what your sign is. Not yet.

I don’t know if you have seen those movies where the Roman charioteers, whip in hand, and their chariots run around the Coliseum, the horses pulling and stressing trying to get away from the punishment of their masters. I have. It is not that the horses are trying to go anywhere, they are trying to get away from their masters and the whip. It is not a positive movement, it s more like a “I want to get out of here.” And I have to tell you that this mortgage crisis looks to me like the same with one big difference: I am not the charioteer, the horses are, and the chariot seems to go nowhere I like. But I will try to find out. At some point I have to go back to my I told you so point of view.

Some time ago, someone made a familiar meaningful comment to me that I never forgot: it takes two to tango. Having said that, I want to move now into the catastrophic dance that both consumers and bankers, investors and their representatives have been performing in this new stage where the economic health of this country and part of the world have been damaged seriously. I will start with the consumer, you and I.

During the past several years, homeowners have been enjoying an ever increasing value in the equity of their homes. As you know, equity is the difference between what you own and what you owe. It seemed that the sky was the limit. Typically Americans used that abode equity to trade up into better and bigger homes as our families’ needs and ambitions went up. More rooms, more bathrooms, basements, the works.

Builders and others who made a living in the construction business added to that frenzy by building bigger houses as well and tempting us to go for broke in order to get them, literally and figuratively. It was not difficult to convince a family who owned a home with a healthy equity to use that equity not only to buy a bigger home, but also to travel, get luxury cars and pay children’s educations with it. Nothing wrong with that; it is called the American dream. But as we have seen recently, the dream has become a nightmare for some.

It was not difficult to convince the homeowners to proceed on that optimistic course because we were always convinced that the equity would continue to go up allowing us to refinance again and again when we needed to tap it to get more cash. And that equity became a temptation not only for the folks who owned the properties but also for those who witnessed with envy that suddenly acquired wealth and wanted a piece of the action.

So, the first tango dancers were the homeowners who wanted to go where no other human in their experience had ever danced before, to paraphrase a well known fictional series television program, but this was when the other tango dancers made it to the floor asking the question: “Shall we dance?” A question that was promptly answered by the proud targets: “Where should I sign?’

There was a plethora of dancers waiting in line. Builders who wanted to create the next home for the buyers, realtors working on commission, lenders, lawyers, bankers, investment bankers, investors, absentee or otherwise, the works. There were so many waiting for the chance to cash a moment on the dancing floor that in order to cover the cost, the interest rates that the borrowers had to pay and the equity to support it had to be high and getting higher. No one anticipated that those equity values would ever go down and that interest rates, many of which were adjustable, no matter how high they were, would become so high that they could not be renegotiated with the lenders through refinancing deals. Unfortunately that optimistic outlook did not happen.

Like the deals we mentioned in the automobile loans examples of the previous articles, many of the folks who had borrowed ridiculously high mortgage amounts at sky high rates that were resetting much higher found themselves unable to afford the payments or get new terms. The equity on the homes they owned had maxed out in value and could not be renegotiated and the lenders were knocking on the door asking for their money. The domino effect was quick and bloody. People who saw the equity of their homes fall below the amount of their loans decided that it was not worth to keep them and told the bankers to stuff it. In the rush many even threw out that sacred symbol of their family structures, their pets. There are many such orphans in the dog pounds these days. Banks, of course, are not in the business of owning homes and renting them out, they want their money back, so they sold them in the market at distressed prices fueling the down price spiral still more. It was not only their money, it was also the money they owed the investors who were anxiously waiting for their return.

This would not have been a problem if you and me had been the only ones affected, but when the number of defaults is in the millions you can see what is going to happen to the country and even beyond to those who participated in this tango. And this is where my chariot stops this time. In my next article I will cover the solutions, both individual and government approved, we should expect sooner rather than later I hope. In an optimistic speech the president of the United States gave in 2006 he bragged about the increase of home ownership during his administration. What he forgot to mention, because he did not anticipate it, was that the increase was a balloon that would eventually burst. Lately he has recognized the problem. A habit that seems to affect everything he touches, whether it is the economy or his foreign policy

And that is my point of view today.

Monday, March 24, 2008

Enron V: the home mortgage crisis. Part IV.

By Paul V. Montesino, PhD, MBA

If you recall my Enron V- Part I’s early warning about spending a shorter amount of time reading my articles on the causes, characteristics and solutions to the current home mortgage crisis than the length of time it might take to cure the crisis itself you will see what I meant. The problem is still hot. As evidence that the rotten American roots of the crisis have produced branches all over the world, the British government announced Sunday that it would bring Northern Rock, a struggling mortgage lender, under its control. It was the first British nationalization of a bank in more than ten years. So here we go again.

Borrowing the automobile financing securitization example of our previous article, I want to help you visualize the components of that crisis and then, at the end, simply change the name of automobiles for homes and you will know exactly how today’s home mortgage crisis worked its way to our doors, no pun intended, and I will be home free, no pun intended here either.

To explain the forces that caused so much misery I want to start with the investors, the folks who supplied the large funds needed to buy the cars, and then later on with the borrowers who bought them with the loans. Imagine if you have one million dollars in the bank. That is a lot of imagination, isn’t it? Think for a moment what you would like to do with that money to make it grow as much as possible and as safely as possible, a respectable proposition I would say. Above all you want to get as high an interest rate on your money as you can for as long as is sensible. That means that you want your investment to produce a better rate of return on your money than any other investments you could have made elsewhere during the same time your money is invested. If other interest rates go down while you are enjoying higher or equal rates you do well and feel as a winner. If rates, on the other hand, go north you suffer financially and mentally because you feel cheated.

When banks lend money to car borrowers at a specific rate, let’s say six percent average, they want to recover the principal funds as soon as possible without having to wait for the individual borrowers to pay their debt for 36, 48 or even 60 months. It is much faster to turn around and look for those investors who, like you, have millions of dollars to invest and want a nice safe return for their money. What the banks want to do is transfer the loans from their books to the investors as securitized loans, essentially bond securities similar to stocks, who now will receive the six percent on the million dollars invested less the operating cost to the banks of servicing the individual automobile loan payments and the guarantee fees charged by insurer agencies that tell the investors that the securitized loans are legit. As folks pay the principal amount of their loans to the bank, the bond balances are also amortized down and the investors get part of their principal back. The banks get operating revenues, at a profit hopefully, and more money to lend. It becomes a cycle that can balloon into many millions of dollars and profits for all parties concerned. All parties, except the automobile borrowing consumers.

You can see here that it behooves the dealers to frontload as much of the cost to the cars as possible and pass those costs to the car buyers, and the banks would prefer to charge their borrowers whatever interest rates the market can bear. If they can get nine percent for the car loans and only have to pay six percent to the investors the banks pocket the difference. At this point I want you to start replacing in your mind the idea that this is a car business with the thought that it may really be a home you are dealing with instead. We will deal with the big difference when we complete the other side of the investment equation, the borrower-buyer.

As a car buyer, you have many options. You can pay the loan on time as promised, you can pay the loan on a late basis or you can stop payments altogether. If you pay your loan as promised, your payments of principal and interest will be directed slowly to the pockets of the investors as they originally expected. There will be a match between their bond principal and interest receivables and their receipts. If you pay the loan late, the banks will still have to pay the bond investors on time and will have to recover at some time the amount shortages with your own funds and the late fees charged to you.

Banks don’t like to do that and they try to make sure that only premium quality folks borrow money to buy cars. The word was “try.” Sometimes it does not work like that. If you stop paying the loan altogether, there is a high probability that the car, sometimes damaged and undervalued, will be repossessed and the loan liquidated at a discount. In many cases, longer term car loans resulted in situations where the value of the cars were less than the loan balances and their owners opted to abandon them. There is no way the bank could pay investors with the automobiles repossessed and, even if you were legally allowed to do so, which is not what the banks promised in the securitized documents, the investors probably live in another state or even another country. What is the bank going to do, ship a Chevy to London to pay a loan in Boston? Not by any mile. You can see what would happen if all of a sudden the economy enters a recessionary period and people lose their jobs and delay or stop paying their loans altogether. Hell, as the old saying goes, would break loose. It is what is happening now all over the United States with the home crisis. And, as I hear more and more, it is what is starting to happen with auto loans again and even credit cards.

Trying to remain true to our intention not to write too long a story we are stopping here to continue in our next article Part V where the home situation finally appears on our radar.

And that is my Point of View today.


Enron V: la crisis de las hipotecas en la vivienda.-Parte IV.

Por Paul V. Montesino, PhD, MBA

Si usted recuerda el pronóstico en mi Enron V- Parte I de que íbamos a consumir menos tiempo leyendo mis artículos sobre las causas, las características y las soluciones de la presente crisis hipotecaria que la longitud de tiempo requerida para solucionarla, usted podrá ver ahora lo que yo quería decir. El problema sigue candente. Como evidencia de que las raíces americanas podridas de esta crisis han producido ramas por todo el mundo, el gobierno británico anunció el domingo que iba a apoderarse de Northern Rock, un prestamista hipotecario en aprieto. Ha sido la primera nacionalización de un banco en Inglaterra en mas de diez años. Así es que aquí vamos otra vez.

Haciendo uso del ejemplo de la seguridad de las finanzas de los automóviles de nuestro artículo anterior, quiero ayudarle a visualizar los componentes de esa crisis del pasado y entonces, al final, simplemente sustituir al nombre de auto por el nombre de hogar y estoy seguro que usted comprenderá claramente como es que la crisis del presente se nos presentó a nuestras puertas, no broma intentada.

Para explicar las fuerzas que causaron tanta miseria quiero comenzar con los inversionistas prestamistas, la gente que suministró los altos fondos que se necesitaban para comprar los carros, y mas tarde mencionar a los deudores que compraron esos autos con el dinero prestado. Imagínese que usted tiene un millón de dólares en el banco. Eso es una gran imaginación, ¿no es cierto? Piense por un momento que a usted le gustaría que ese dinero creciera lo mas posible de la manera mas segura disponible, un objetivo muy respetable como es lógico. Por encima de todo usted quiere obtener un interés lo mas elevado posible por el tiempo que sea más práctico. Eso significa obtener un rédito en su dinero mayor que en cualquier otra inversión que usted hubiera podido hacer en otro lugar con esos fondos. Si los intereses bajan mientras usted disfruta de réditos iguales o mayores, usted se siente feliz. Si, por el contrario, los intereses del mercado suben en comparación a los de su inversión usted sufre financiera y mentalmente porque se siente violado.

Cuando los bancos prestan dinero a compradores de autos a una tasa de interés específica, digamos un promedio de seis por ciento, ellos quieren recuperar sus fondos tan pronto como sea posible sin tener que esperar a que los prestatarios paguen su deuda en 36, 48 o a veces sesenta meses. Es mucho mas rápido y productivo buscar por inversionistas que, como usted en nuestro ejemplo, tienen millones de dólares para invertir y desean un retorno pronto del dinero invertido. Lo que los bancos quieren hacer es transferir esos préstamos en sus records a los inversionistas a través de préstamos garantizados, esencialmente bonos similares a acciones. Como compensación los inversionistas recibirán de los bancos el seis por ciento sobre los millones de dólares invertidos menos los costos de operar y mantener los pagos individuales mensuales que hacen los compradores de autos. Los bancos también tendrán que pagar y deducir ciertos honorarios requeridos por agencias especializadas de seguro que le garantizan a los inversionistas que la inversión es legítima.

A medida que los dueños de los autos hacen sus pagos de principal al banco, los balances de los bonos se amortizan y los inversionistas reciben parte de su inversión inicial. Los bancos reciben ingresos operativos, con utilidades se supone, y mas dinero que prestar. Esa actividad se convierte en un ciclo de dinero que puede crecer a muchos millones de dólares y utilidades para todos los que participan en el ciclo. Todos los participantes con excepción de los consumidores que han pedido prestado dinero para comprar los autos: usted y yo.

Como usted puede ver, es de mucho interés para los vendedores de autos añadir tanto costo como puedan a los precios de los carros y pasar esos costos a los compradores y los bancos preferirían cobrar los intereses mas elevados que el mercado acepte. Si ellos pueden obtener el nueve por ciento por los préstamos que hacen y solo tienen que pagar el seis por ciento a los inversionistas, el banco se mete en el bolsillo la diferencia. En este momento quiero pedirle que usted comience a sustituir en su mente la idea de que esto es un negocio de autos de no mas de treinta mil dólares y en su lugar piense que se trata de préstamos hipotecarios de cientos de miles. Nosotros nos encargaremos de esa gran diferencia cuando completemos el otro lado de la ecuación inversionista, el comprador-prestatario.

Como comprador de auto a plazos usted sabe que tiene varias opciones: puede pagar el préstamo como prometió, lo puede pagar atrasado o puede dejar de pagarlo por completo. Si usted paga su préstamo como prometió, sus pagos de principal e interés serán dirigidos a los bolsillos de los inversionistas como ellos lo esperaban. Habrá una relación equilibrada entre el principal y el interés a cobrar por parte de los bonos y sus cobros actuales. Si usted paga el préstamo atrasado los bancos tienen todavía que pagar a esos inversionistas de bonos de acuerdo con lo prometido en los bonos vendidos y tendrán que recuperar esos fondos mas tarde cuando usted al fin pague, incluyendo cargos por pagos tardíos.

A los banqueros no les gusta que eso ocurra y tratan de asegurarse que solo personas de buen crédito reciban fondos para comprar autos. La palabra llave es “tratan.” Algunas veces no ocurre de esa manera. Si usted deja de pagar el préstamo, hay una gran probabilidad de que el auto, algunas veces dañado y devaluado, será recuperado y el préstamo liquidado a descuento. En muchos casos, préstamos a largo plazo han resultado en situaciones en las que el valor de los autos ha sido menor que el balance del préstamo y sus dueños han optado por abandonarlos. No hay manera que los bancos puedan pagar a los inversionistas con autos recuperados e incluso, si fuera legalmente posible hacerse, esos inversionistas probablemente viven en otro estado o tal vez otro país.

¿Qué va a hacer el banco, enviar un Chevy a Londres para pagar un financiamiento de Boston? De eso nada. Usted puede imaginarse lo que sucedería si de repente la economía entra en un período de recesión, la gente pierde sus trabajos y demoran o dejan de pagar sus obligaciones. Tremenda crisis. Eso es lo que está ocurriendo en estos instantes en los Estados Unidos ahora con la crisis de las hipotecas de las viviendas. Y leo que está comenzando a ocurrir también nuevamente con los préstamos de autos y hasta las tarjetas de crédito.

Tratando de cumplir con nuestro compromiso personal de no escribir historias largas hacemos un alto aquí para continuar en nuestro próximo articulo, la Parte V, donde la situación de la vivienda aparece al fin en nuestro radar.

Y ese es mi Punto de Vista hoy.


Friday, February 22, 2008

Enron V: the home mortgage crisis. Part III.

Note: In our previous article, Part II, regarding the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), we incorrectly attributed its year of enactment by Congress to 1976. It was 1977. Does not make any difference but you should know.

We referred to the times when it was necessary for Congress to step in and make sure that credit was available to everyone as “the lean years.” And banks realized that, in order to respond and provide those services required by the new law, they had to deal with a credit picture they were not fond of or familiar with, so it took a while for the new engine to get roaring both emotionally and technically. In reality, however, the banks benefited by the new rules. Indeed there was an unsatisfied demand for funds and, more importantly, people were deserving of an opportunity to get that demand satisfied. But something else was happening in the banking world at the same time: increase in technology.

Coincidental with the need to spread the services around, banks were being supplied with the growing availability of ATM machines and online connections that allowed them to do business everywhere anytime. And the large size requirements to implement the CRA compliance strategy meant larger banks as well and the ability to fund their deposit requirements from any source no matter where that source was located. Securitization of bank credit products started to become available as the banking world moved into the nineteen eighties.

Banks that could not afford to invest aggressively went by the wayside as merger mania took over. Big fish swallowed small fish. Do you remember the last time you saw a Bank of New England, Bank of Boston, Baybank or Shawmut Bank office sign? Do you even remember that such names existed? The match between borrowers and investors became looser. People went to their local bank for loans but the deposits that were needed to satisfy that thirst were not coming from their own communities and neighbors as it had happened in the past but coming from far away, first from other bank offices of the same institution and later from other sources of funds that included Wall Street and the international market.

I witnessed such a situation with the car loan business in the late nineteen eighties that went under the name of securitization. Car dealers all over the nation became associated with their banking institutions in large scale. Simply stated, you would go to the car dealer to buy a car on credit, the dealer would process the paperwork and their bank would supply the funds needed for the purchase, you signed the note, and out you went with your new jalopy. The bank, in turn, would accumulate enough of those notes and issued guaranteed securities backed up by those notes. Banks, corporations and individuals in the USA or even abroad would buy the securities and get repaid at a specified rate as the loans were paid down.

Bond rating agencies guaranteed the soundness of those securities that for all intent and purposes were like any other stock or bond public issues, including compliance with the rules of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC.) The negative side of those securities was that lack of performance by the car borrowers resulted in huge losses to the banks issuing those securitized instruments and, to our chagrin, I witnessed those losses in my own banking organization. And one of the reasons for the debacle was the availability of easy credit, I should call it irresponsible credit, on the part of lenders and borrowers alike. It is not easy to make loan payments on a new luxury car when your only source of income is an hourly rate from a fast food outlet or, when the car you bought is a lemon easy to abandon.

I am sure it is not difficult for you to visualize the similarities between lending and borrowing to securitize car loans and doing the same for a home mortgage. Unfortunately the basic difference is more dramatic. When one owns a car one may be able to borrow or rent one or use public transportation if one loses it. If the home is the loss, well, you are starting to get the picture. And the housing mess we are in now requires that we complete our mission in our next article: Part IV. See you then.

And this is my point of view today.

Note: At the close of this article, the FBI announced that it is starting an investigation of the players in the subprime mortgage crisis that is fueling the current Real Estate debacle.


Enron V: La crisis de la vivienda. Parte III

Nota: En nuestro previo artículo, Parte II, cuando nos referimos al Acta de Reinversión de la Comunidad (CRA), atribuimos incorrectamente el año de su aprobación por el Congreso a 1976. Fue en realidad 1977. No que la diferencia tenga importancia, pero usted debe saberlo.

Nos referimos en esa ocasión al período en que se hizo necesario que el Congreso interviniera en la situación y se asegurara que el crédito estaba disponible para todos con el nombre de “época de las vacas flacas.” Y los bancos se dieron cuenta que, para poder responder y proveer los servicios requeridos por la nueva ley, tenían que bregar con un nuevo escenario al que no estaban muy aficionados o familiarizados, así que llevó algún tiempo para que el nuevo motor comenzara a andar emocional o técnicamente. En realidad, sin embargo, los bancos se beneficiaron con las nuevas reglas. Había verdaderamente una demanda insaciable de fondos y, mas importante todavía, gentes que se merecían tener esa demanda satisfecha. Pero algo mas estaba ocurriendo al mismo tiempo en el mundo bancario de entonces: incremento en la tecnología.

Al mismo tiempo que surgió la necesidad de expandir sus servicios, los bancos estaban recibiendo la creciente presencia de máquinas automáticas de efectivo y conexiones en línea electrónica que les permitía conducir sus negocios donde sus clientes querían cuando lo quisieran. Y los requerimientos de mayor tamaño para implementar la estrategia de cumplimiento de la ley del CRA significaba la presencia también de bancos mas grandes que tuvieran la habilidad de capitalizar sus requerimientos de depósitos de cualquier fuente inversionista sin importar donde estaba localizada esa fuente. Los aseguramientos de productos de crédito bancario comenzaron a hacerse disponibles a medida que el mundo bancario se movía hacia los años mil novecientos ochenta.

Las instituciones bancarias que no podían invertir agresivamente se cayeron a un lado y la manía de consolidación se apoderó de la industria. El pez grande se comio al chico. ¿Recuerda usted la ultima vez que vio un símbolo de Banco New England, Banco de Boston, Baybank o Banco Shawmut? ¿Recuerda usted que tales nombres existían? La conexión entre los prestamistas y los inversionistas se hizo mas confusa. La gente fue a su banco local para pedir prestado, pero los depósitos que se necesitaban para satisfacer esa necesidad no venían de sus propias comunidades y vecinos como ocurría en el pasado sino de lugares mas lejanos, primero otras oficinas de la misma institución y mas tarde de otras fuentes de fondos que incluían a Wall Street y el mercado internacional.

Yo fui testigo de una situación similar con el negocio de préstamos de automóviles al fin de los años ochenta y que se llamaba Aseguramiento. Los vendedores de automóviles en toda la nación se asociaron con sus instituciones bancarias a larga escala. Simplemente explicado, usted iba a un negociante de autos para comprar su carro preferido a crédito, el vendedor procesaba los papeles y su banco le suministraba los fondos necesitados para la compra, usted firmaba la nota y salía del salón con su nuevo carro. El banco, por otra parte, acumulaba un número suficiente de esas notas y emitía bonos garantizados por ellas. Bancos, corporaciones e individuos en los Estados Unidos o incluso el extranjero compraban esas seguridades que se repagaban a una tasa específica de interés mientras los préstamos se reducían.

Agencias privadas de clasificación de bonos garantizaban la solidez de esas seguridades que en la práctica eran iguales a otras emisiones de acciones o bonos públicos del mercado, inclusive el respeto a las reglas de la Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC.) El lado negativo de esas seguridades era que la delincuencia de los prestamistas de automóviles resultaba en pérdidas enormes para los bancos que emitían esas seguridades y, para mi disgusto, fui testigo de esas pérdidas en mi propia institución bancaria. Y una de las razones de la debacle fue la disponibilidad de crédito fácil, yo debía llamarlo crédito irresponsable, por parte de ambos prestatarios y prestamistas. No es fácil hacer pagos de préstamos sobre un auto de lujo cuando la única fuente de ingreso que se tiene es un salario por hora en una tienda de alimento rápido o cuando el carro que se compró es un limón que es fácil abandonar.

Estoy convencido que no es difícil visualizar la naturaleza similar entre pedir prestado y prestar para asegurar préstamos de autos y hacer lo mismo para la hipotecas sobre la vivienda. Desafortunadamente la diferencia básica es mas dramática. Cuando uno es dueño de un auto que no se puede pagar uno puede prestar o alquilar otro si lo pierde. Si su hogar es la pérdida, bueno, usted puede ver el cuadro claramente. Y el reguero que se ha formado en la vivienda ahora requiere que completemos nuestra misión en nuestro próximo articulo Parte IV. Nos vemos entonces.

Y ese es mi punto de vista hoy.

Nota: Al cierre de este artículo, el FBI anunció que está comenzando una investigación de
los
participantes en las hipotecas de segunda calidad que están dando fuerza a la debacle
de los
bienes de raíces de hoy día.

Wednesday, January 30, 2008

A seed planted by a man named Martin.

On April 4, 1968, almost forty years ago, Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. was assassinated. This month, on January 15 1929 he was been born in Atlanta, Georgia, and the country that witnessed his long dedication and arduous path to martyrdom that has become his mark on this earth stops for a few hours to light a candle on the third week to remember him with respect.

I don’t believe I am capable or even authorized to write about the life of this man and reflect about the true measure and dimension of his life. But that is OK. Others have done so with more prose and flavor than me, perhaps with more right as well. But I think I can share a thought or two with my readers about a life that has become a beacon of hope for humanity, a beacon that was extinguished by the hand of a criminal who represented the worst in all of us, but a beacon that continues to shine to this day.

It is easy to reflect on his life and lose the real meaning and reach of what he did. One remembers the tired and angry faces of those who marched with him and may reach the erroneous conclusion that he was fighting a black cause alone. Don’t get me wrong, his immediate goal was to raise the living condition of those who shared his roots and his race, but his train was not meant to stop at that station. His goal was to liberate all of us. I don’t care if our skin is white or brown, if we suffer an injustice he died for us as well.

This month, as we sit and watch the normal political controversies that surround our nation’s electoral primary process, we see a new nation, the 21st Century America, taking shape in front of us and we have no recourse other than to marvel at the vision that sustained Dr. King on his way to eternity. We now know what maintained his hope: “I have a dream,” he said in Washington on August 28, 1963, “that my four little children will one day live in a nation where they will not be judged by the color of their skin but by the content of their character.” For the first time in our history we see an African American and a woman vying for the top leadership position in the country and we believe it is possible that they might succeed.

Of course, there are still those who hate and wallow in the mud of prejudice because they have no other reason to express their weak beliefs and confuse tradition with inaction. But those sands of ignorance and misunderstanding are being wiped out by a tsunami like ocean of faith in the American future. And there are many more that are willing to raise their eyes and see now the top of the mountain that became Dr. King’s sole revelation at the time. We don’t know the details of where this newfound hope is going to lead us. We cannot fathom the end of the road in terms of personalities, actually that is irrelevant, but we are absolutely sure that this new paradigm is the harvest from the seed planted by a man named Martin who was not afraid to die for his dream. Death, after all, befalls us all sooner or later; immortality only a few.

And that is my point of view today.

For more information, please visit http://www.LatinoWorldOnline.com



La semilla sembrada por un hombre llamado Martín.

El cuatro de abril de 1968, casi cuarenta años atrás, el Dr. Martin Luther King fue asesinado. Este mes, en Enero 15 del 1929 había nacido en Atlanta, Georgia, y la nación que fue testigo de su larga dedicación y ardua senda al martirio que se ha convertido en su huella en esta tierra se detiene por unas horas para encender una vela en la tercera semana del mes y recordarlo con respeto.

No creo que soy capaz o siquiera autorizado para escribir sobre la vida de este hombre y reflexionar sobre la dimensión verdadera de su vida. Pero eso está bien. Otros han hecho lo mismo con mas prosa y sabor que yo, tal vez con mas derecho también. Pero yo creo que puedo compartir un pensamiento o dos con mis lectores sobre una vida que se ha convertido en un faro de esperanza para la raza humana, una luz que fue extinguida por una mano criminal que representaba lo peor en todos nosotros, pero un faro que sigue brillando hoy día.

Es fácil reflexionar sobre su vida y perder el significado verdadero de lo que hizo. Uno recuerda las caras cansadas y enojadas de aquellos que marchaban con él y podemos llegar a la conclusión errónea de que lo que hacia era luchar por una causa negra solamente. No me entiendan mal, su objetivo inmediato fue mejorar las condiciones de vida de sus raíces y su raza, pero ese tren no se suponías que parara en esa estación. Su objetivo fue liberarnos a todos nosotros. No me importa si nuestra piel es blanca o carmelita; si sufrimos una injusticia él murió por nosotros.

Este mes, mientras nos sentábamos y observábamos las controversias que rodean al proceso de nuestra primaria electoral contemplamos una nación, los Estados Unidos del siglo 21, que toma forma en frente de nosotros y no tenemos otro recurso que no sea maravillarnos de la visión que sostuvo al doctor King en su camino a la eternidad. Ahora sabemos que mantenía esa esperanza: “Yo tengo un sueño,” dijo en Washington en Agosto 28 de 1963,”que mis cuatro hijos pequeños algún día vivirán en una nación donde no serán juzgados por el color de su piel sino por el contenido de su carácter.” Por primera vez en nuestra historia vemos a un Americano Africano y a una mujer compitiendo por la posición mas elevada de nuestra nación y creemos que es posible que puedan ganar.

Desde luego, todavía existen algunos que odian y se revuelcan en el lodo del prejuicio porque no tienen otra forma de expresar sus creencias débiles y confunden la tradición con la inacción. Pero esas arenas de ignorancia y falta de entendimiento están siendo eliminadas por un tsunami oceánico de fe en el futuro de los Estados Unidos. Y hay muchos otros que están ansiosos por alzar sus ojos y ver el tope de la montaña que se convirtió en la única revelación en aquel momento para el Dr. King. No sabemos cuales son los detalles de la dirección en que esta nueva esperanza nos va a dirigir. No podemos definir el final del camino en términos de personalidades, en realidad es irrelevante, pero estamos absolutamente seguros de que este nuevo paradigma es la cosecha de una semilla plantada por un hombre llamado Martin que no temía morir por sus sueños. La muerte, después de todo, nos afecta a todos mas tarde o mas temprano; la inmortalidad solo a unos pocos.

Y ese es mi punto de vista hoy.

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